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Althusser's Mirror
Abstract
Jacques Lacan significantly influenced Althusser's accounts of ideology and the subject. Althusser's
belief that science is a discourse without a subject parallels Lacan's belief that in the Symbolic Order the
Subject and the Other are alienated. Althusser's account of interpellation, which explains how ideology
recognizes individuals as subjects, takes for granted Lacan's notion of the mirror stage. Althusser
repudiates the plenitude of the subject, whose interpellation conceals its lack; Lacan shows that the
subject's failure to express itself in language makes the subject a void. However, Althusser, whose subject
is too much like Lacan's ego, fails to distinguish between the "I" of the split subject and the "ego" of the
subject's imaginary self-identity. What is more, Althusser rejects the self-consciousness implied by the
subject's lack of plenitude and its suturing interpellation.
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Althusser's Mirror
Carsten Strathausen
University of Oregon
My attempt to read Althusser in the light of Lacanian psychoanalysis is based on the premise that Marxism should give more consideration
to the individual's need for recognition and its question of identity than
orthodox Marxism was willing to concede-a belief commonly held by
most leftist intellectuals today. As Easthope pointed out, this shift of
emphasis has been one of the major achievements of Althusser's work,
and Althusser himself acknowledged his indebtedness to psychoanalysis.' In his essay "Freud and Lacan," he praises Lacan for having
defined "as rigorously as it is possible" ("Freud" 156) the object of
psychoanalysis (the unconscious), thus elevating psychoanalysis to the
rank of a science-a statement clearly intended to parallel Lacan's
achievements in regard to psychoanalysis (his return to Freud) with
Althusser's understanding of his own merits in regard to Marxism (the
return to Marx). In the following, I shall try to examine Lacan's
influence on Althusser's work with respect to ideology and the subject,
which I believe to greatly exceed that of a parallel or an occasional
"borrowing" of concepts.' However, the objective of such a confrontation is not merely to enlist all obvious differences between the source
and its interpretation, but rather to concentrate on the positive potential
of any appropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the understanding
of ideology.

Where I Think,

I Am Not

In his famous Essay "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Althusser claims that ideology represents "the imaginary
relation of
individuals to the real relations in which they live"
("Ideology" 39). Contrary to the common understanding of ideology
as 'false consciousness', where ideology is believed to distort or in any
way mis-represent reality (i.e., the real relations of any given society,
its relations of production), Althusser asserts that ideology is "above all
the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production" ("Ideology" 39). Ideology is thus "a second degree relation"
(For Marx 233), for it does not primarily aim at the real relations of
.

.

.

production (first degree relation); rather, it expresses the imaginary, but
nonetheless "lived" relation between individuals and these relations of
production (second degree relation).'
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Ideology maintains this "imaginary" relation through the process
of interpellation-it interpellates individuals as subjects. Interpellation
works through a specular recognition-process between the individual
(the "subject-to-be") and an Absolute Subject that functions as the
"center" of each ideology, let us say God.' The voice of God calls the
individual by its name and thus defines him/her as a free subject. By
acknowledging its position, the individual also recognizes the superiority of the Absolute Subject that called it by its name (i.e., God).
Hereby, the individual is "subjectivized" in a double sense: it is
interpellated as a subject, but at the same time subjected to the Absolute
Subject and thus active in history only in order to reproduce the existing
relations of production. It is this mutual recognition between subjects
and Subject that Althusser calls the "duplicate mirror-structure of
ideology" ("Ideology" 54). This insight into how interpellation works
can only be sustained with the help of science:
ideology never says, 'I am ideological.' It is necessary to be outside
ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge, to be able to say: I am in
ideology (a quite exceptional case) or (general case): I was in
ideology. As is well known, the accusation of being in ideology
only applies to others, never to oneself (unless one is really a
Spinozist or a Marxist .). ("Ideology" 49)
.

.

It is obvious that the "quite exceptional case" Althusser mentions
above presents itself in the form of a logical contradiction: Marxists
know themselves to be inside ideology, but for this knowledge to exist,
they must have already been in the realm of science and thus outside of
ideology. Althusser acknowledges this paradox, claiming that he as a
"subject" necessarily remains trapped in ideology, whereas "his"

discourse analyzes ideology from the outside. This can only mean that
scientific discourse is a "subject-less discourse" ("Ideology" 45);
scientists as "subjects" are always absent from "their" discourse. This
idea seems to mirror Lacan's account of the alienation between Subject
and Other (the Symbolic Order). Lacan asserts that meaning emerges
in the field of the Other that always excludes Being (the subject) (Four
Fundamental Concepts, 211). Thus, Althusser concludes:
it is literally no longer the eye (the mind's eye) of a subject which
sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic:
it is this field itself which sees itself in the objects or problems it
defines. (Reading Capital 25)
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It is clear that Althusser's "field" and Lacan's "Other" are not quite
the same, but it is more important here to realize that in Althusser's

version, language has been assigned a key-role in the self-reflection
process of a structural field when at the very same time it has been
denied this function for human subjects.' Critics have argued that the
repressed subjectivity of human individuals reappears as the subjectivity of a structural field-"the return of the repressed" (Frank 128).6
The argument is well taken, I think. According to Hindess and Hirst,
Althusser calls his field "an `eternity' in the Spinozist sense ofthe word:
it is the cause of itself, it is infinite in its kind, and as itself it must
necessarily exist"-this definition comes very close to the classical
understanding of subjectivity (312). Althusser almost admits this
himself when he states:
Mlle true subjects (in the sense of the constitutive subjects of the
process) are therefore not these occupants and functionaries, are
not
"concrete individuals", "real men"-but the definition
and distribution of these places and functions. The true "subjects"
are these definers and distributors: the relations of production (and
political and ideological social relations). (Reading Capital 180)
.

.

.

He continues by saying that "these are relations" and therefore
"cannot be thought within the category subject" (Reading Capital
180). This explanation is hardly satisfactory, but it is indispensable for
Althusser in order to distinguish radically between science and ideology.
Althusser does indeed maintain this binary opposition throughout
most of his writings and contends that truth can only be sustained
through the logical coherence of the argument within a scientific
discourse.' Ideology, however, is not simply "false," since the "imaginary" always comprises elements of the "real" (For Marx 233-34).
Rather, ideology "is distinguished from science in that in it the
practico-social function is more important than the theoretical function
(function as knowledge)" (For Marx 231). The primary function of
ideology is to interpellate individuals as subjects, and as such ideology
"is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed
and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence" (For Marx 235).8 For Althusser, epistemological categories
primarily apply to science and are of secondary importance in regard
to ideology. Hirst goes even further than that. For him, the imaginary
"cannot be false since it is not an idea or conception of things, but . . .
a part of social relations." It follows that ideology "may derive from
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forms of the imaginary, but it is not false" (Hirst 38). Hirst presents
ideology strictly as a matter of "lived relations" and his view is
supported by Althusser's claim that ideology has a material existence.
But ideology is material only because Althusser fully equates the belief
in subjectivity with the action resulting from this belief:

the existence of the ideas of his [the subject's] belief is material in
that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material
practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the
ideas of that subject. ("Ideology" 43)

This materiality of ideology cannot of course be falsified. But one must
not forget that the belief in something that does not exist (subjectivity)
can have effects, but it cannot actually cause the existence of what is
believed in. Humans are active in history but "considered as agents,
human individuals are not 'free' and 'constitutive' subjects in the
philosophical sense of the term" ("Reply" 134). For Althusser,
originating subjects do not exist, and to believe in them is false in an
epistemological sense. Eagleton, therefore, claims that besides his
"positivist" view of ideology, Althusser equally endorses a "rationalist" view which "relegates ideology to the false 'other' of true
knowledge" (153) and charges Hirst with collapsing the epistemological question into the ontological one: although it is true that people
actually believe in subjectivity and live accordingly, it is nonetheless
false to believe in it, because subjectivity itself does not exist (153). In
other words: it is crucial to distinguish between the epistemologically
"false" belief in subjectivity and the actual existence and consequences of such false beliefs.
Strictly speaking, this can only mean that the subjective view-point
is not "false," but simply impossible, because its agent (Trager), the
originating subject, does not really exist. What does exist are subjectagents of ideology, who try to occupy the impossible position of
subjectivity by acting "as if" they were subjects. So Eagleton's
conclusion that the "subject-centered view of reality" is "bound to get
things wrong" can only be understood in the following way: a true
"subject-centered view of reality" is impossible, so that everybody
who believes him or herself to maintain this perspective occupies
"some deceptively 'centered' standpoint" and thus inevitably "gets
things wrong" (152). Hence, as far as Eagleton is concerned, the falsity
of ideology ultimately consists in its effects: "The imaginary mappings
of ideological fictions are false
in the sense that they actually get
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/7
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society wrong," whereas Althusser continuously tries to emphasize the
actual cause for these misperceptions of reality, which is the humanist
belief in something that does not exist (subjectivity) (152). Eager to
show that Althusser also held a "rationalist" view of ideology,
Eagleton is forced to present a reading in which ideology again comes
very close to the traditional notion of "false consciousness," explicitly
opposed by Althusser. This problematic is indeed inherent in Althusser's
work. Ideology is constituted through the belief in the category of the
subject, and albeit this belief is material in the sense that it exists and
is lived by acting "subjects," it is nonetheless false on the content-level
since its signified does not correspond to reality. Ideology has no
referent, it simply creates its own. This means that ideology "has no
outside (for itself), but at the same time
it is nothing but outside (for
science and reality)" ("Ideology" 49). The "falsity" of ideology is
merely a matter of perspective, and since the scientist Althusser lived
in ideology but "was spoken" from the outside, he does not so much
"oscillate" (Eagleton 152) between the different views of ideology as
try to emphasize their interconnectedness, the fact that both must exist
simultaneously.
.

A

. .

Look In The Mirror: Lacan

Althusser's essay on interpellation had to face a major criticism
that concerned its temporal structure: when exactly are concrete
individuals interpellated as subject-agents of ideology? Althusser's
claim that individuals are "always-already" subjects suggests that
individuals never really existed and are only a necessary theoretical
projection of a scientific discourse that can explain the working of
ideology only in the form of a temporal succession, when in fact "these
things happen without any succession" ("Ideology" 49). Althusser
simply cannot circumvent the necessity of having to narrate in order to
explain the way in which subjects are interpellated, but the very form
of narration, so he claims, unavoidably distorts the truth. This, however,
seems to contradict his previous assertion concerning the specific
nature of scientific discourse. If knowledge is to provide its own criteria
for verification, it is absolutely essential that we take the argument itself
literally-if Althusser does not really mean what he says, how can we
evaluate the coherence of what is being argued for? On the level of
discourse, the distinction between individuals and subjects must remain
valid, even if it might not be real, but only a theoretical abstraction.
Without this distinction, concrete individuals would have never existed
as such, a consideration that renders interpellation itself and the
Published by New Prairie Press
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discourse talking about it totally superfluous. However, with the
distinction upheld, it is incomprehensible how the individual can
recognize itself without having already been "a 'subject' prior to
ideology" (Hirst 67). Althusser's moment of interpellation through the
double mirror-structure of ideology is either an unnecessary fiction or
it presupposes an originating subject in order to "produce" a subjectagent of ideology.
It is obvious that Althusser's concept of interpellation rests on the
idea of the "mirror-stage" as the founding moment of the "imaginary," a theory which Lacan developed in his essay "The Mirror Stage
as Formative of the Function of the I." In a way, Lacan "avoided" the
logical contradiction in Althusser's mirror- structure by fully subscribing to it: on the one hand, the child's identification with its mirror-image
(which is an "Ideal-I" functioning as the "Absolute Subject" in
Althusser's sense) merely anticipates a wholeness that is yet to come
and therefore results in an ambivalent relationship of the individual to
its image. Lacan emphasizes that the idealized reflection is loved as
much as hated: the separating distance between self and image cannot
be entirely overcome, since it is exactly this difference that motivates
the identification in the first place. The child can pretend to be
"whole," but cannot act accordingly. The failure to control fully the
other results in a frustration which causes the child to oscillate between
different roles of identity.9 On the other hand, the identification
retroactively posits whatever precedes the constitution of the ego; that
which antedates the ego is a mere fantasy projected back in time after
the look in the mirror. There is no original. Gallop shows that the
moment of the mirror-stage "is the source not only for what follows but
In other words, the self is constituted through
also for what precedes.
anticipating what it will become, and then this anticipatory model is
used for gauging what was before" (80-81).
We must note that in this account the constitution of the ego seems
to comprise only self and other without any interference from outside.
But Lacan later added an important aspect to his mirror-essay which
concerns the "look of the Other" as a desired acknowledgement or
verification of the child's recognition process. It consists:
. . .

in the gesture by which the child at the mirror, turning around to the
person carrying it appeals with a look to the witness who decants,
by verifying it, the recognition of the image from the jubilant
assumption, in which, to be sure, it [such recognition] already was.
(Cited in Weber 116)
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/7
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This supplement changes the former dyadic structure of the child's
recognition into a "triadic relation in which acknowledgment emanates
not from the self-identical ego, but from the 'person who carries it,' that
is, from the place of the Other" (Weber 118). Thus, Lacan's subject
literally is in question: "What I seek in speech is the response of the
other. What constitutes me as subject is my question" (Lacan 86). The
subject is "defined in his articulation by the signifier," which "requires
another locus--the locus of the Other" (Lacan 303 and 305). But the
subject's attempt to express itself in language fails, because the subject
of the enunciation and the subject of the enounced do not merge. Thus,
against the certitude of the Cartesian subject, Lacan insists on a fading
subject, for it is only "present" in its own discourse as a lack-it
disappears in language. As Zizek puts it: "[T]he subject ofthe signifier
is a retrospective effect of the failure of its own representation" (Zizek
The Sublime 175). More precisely: it is the anticipation of this failure
that retrospectively defines the subject as a void. We encounter here the
same temporal structure as in the imaginary (in respect to the constitution of the ego), and Lacan expresses this dialectics in the constitutional
process of the subject through the use of the future anterior, "[t]he time
of the ecrits" (Gallop 82). He notes:

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was,
since it is no more, or even the past perfect of what has been in what
I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am
in the process of becoming. (Lacan 86)
Althusser, on the contrary, was much more skeptical about any history
written in the future anterior, in which he suspected the mere reduction
of a scientific problem to its own premises. Since knowledge is a matter
of production, a process can only be studied with the help of principles
that already presuppose a partially or fully developed theory of that
process-this circle is unavoidable. But Althusser nonetheless distinguishes between ideological and scientific principles at work. Having
introduced a list of Marxist principles, which he juxtaposed to Hegelian
ones, Althusser states: "I should add that these [Marxist] principles,
unlike the previous ones, are not in the strict sense ideological principles, but scientific ones: in other words, they are not the truth of the
process to be studied (as are all the principles of a history in the 'future
anterior')" (For Marx 63). This could be read both ways: the principles
of a history in the future anterior are scientific, i.e., not the "truth of,"
or ideological, because they are the "truth of " In another passage,
however, Althusser explicitly declares the history in the "future
Published by New Prairie Press
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anterior" inadequate, because it simply projects later developments
back in time (finds in the future the "truth of ' the past), but does not
apply them to what existed before (consider the future the "truth for"
the past) (For Marx 75). Science must necessarily "borrow" its
beginning, since it must start somewhere. But as it develops, it covers
its grounds again and transforms them by accounting theoretically for
its own genesis as well as for any other historical process. A history in
the future anterior, by contrast, cannot explain "other things than
itself"; it simply describes a full circle, repeating itself. Which is to say,
Althusser would have hardly approved of Lacan's history of the subject
had he fully understood its temporal dialectics.

Suture and Ideology
Althusser's appropriation of Lacan thus implements different meanings
of the terms employed. Most importantly, Althusser's subject is reminiscent of the Lacanian "ego" that Lacan defines as an object-"an
object which fulfills a certain function that we call the imaginary
function" (Cited in Heath 31). As such, the constitution of the ego is
merely "the source of secondary identifications" leading to the
"disappearance" of the subject (Lacan 2). It is thus crucial to distinguish between the "I" (Je) which denotes the split subject of the
signifier, and the ego (moi) as the imaginary self-identity of the subject.
Althusser's concept of interpellation "is not the constitution of the
subject
but an extreme confirmation of the ego or a fantasy of 'the
subject' " (Heath 32). This also explains why "the hailed individual
will turn around"-a "strange phenomenon" which Althusser could
not account for theoretically and was able to explain only by referring
to the "experience" (N.B.!) of practical telecommunication ("Ideology" 48). The "turning round" ofhai led individuals does not mean that
they actually "become a subject," but that they want to be recognized
as an object in the Lacanian sense: they hope to confirm their fantasy
of being "whole."
However, the differences between Althusser and Lacan still appear
to be merely of a terminological nature: one might argue that Althusser
does not believe in a plentitude of the subject either, since for him the
originating "Subject" in the philosophical sense does not exist. So,
when Althusser claims that hailed individuals become subjects, he
means of course their illusion to be an originating subject, a fantasy
subject, the subject as the object of ideology. Accordingly, one cannot
understand Althusser's interpellation as taking place in the Lacanian
"imaginary"-how could it, since interpellation works by hailing
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/7
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individuals and thus needs language in order to function properly?
Rather, the concept of interpellation seems "to be intimately related to
that of suture," i.e., it always takes place as "the conjunction of
imaginary and symbolic transactions" (Silverman 219). Suture, according to Miller, names the relation of the subject to the chain of its
discourse; .. . it figures there as the element which is lacking. Thus, the
subject "is not purely and simply absent," but takes the "form of a
stand-in" (25f). Miller's findings are based on set-theory. Without
attempting to follow his line of argument, it suffices in this context to
recall that any true logical system without reference to the real must
necessarily conceptualize an object that is not identical with itself and
hence does not really exist as a thing.'° This impossible object, which
Miller names the subject, needs to be evoked only in order to be
immediately rejected as impossible by the logical discourse. The
subject consists of pure negativity, for it literally embodies that which
does not exist; it marks the absence of the impossible by "taking its
place," erecting itself in the empty space. Logical discourse is constituted on the subject as the vanishing element: "the definition of the
subject comes down to the possibility of one signifier more" (Miller
33). The subject, itself meaningless, enables meaning. Suture, thus,
names the process by which the subject identifies itself with itself as the
nonidentical; it identifies with the lack as the result of its failed
representation. As such, the subject is built on the denial of the process
that constitutes it.
Since in a way ideology "functions as a discourse" (Zizek, The
Sublime 124) insofar as it tries to establish a unified totalized field, we
can conclude that no attempt to constitute a totality will ever succeed,
for there is always one element too much, which is charged with
representing nothing. Any totality literally rests on its impossibility; it
exists only as sutured in so far as it has to exclude the one element it
nonetheless depends upon. This "surplus One which fills out the lack,
is the signifier which represents the subject (the void, Zero )" (Zizek,
For They Know 47). For Zizek, the subject must therefore be "strictly
opposed to the effect of subjectivation" (Zizek, The Sublime 175). It is
not some richness constituted by different modes of interpellation but
a lack represented by a signifier." However, although interpellation
does not constitute the subject, it nonetheless provides the space for it
to emerge as a lack and simultaneously tries to cover this lack again: on
the one hand, interpellation results in a leftover "which opens the space
for desire and makes the Other inconsistent," i.e., enables the subject
to function as a "stand-in," while on the other hand subjectivation
masks "a lack in the structure, a lack which is the subject" (Zizek, The
Published by New Prairie Press
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Sublime 175).12 The inevitable failure of ideological interpellation
(inevitable because any totalitarian project is sutured by an element that
represents its impossibility) results in a lack. Ideology attempts to mask
this lack through a fantasy, which again works through identification.
This implies that every ideological edifice (i.e., the idea of Society as
an organic Whole) "knows" about its own impossibility (the fact that
it will never become real) and thus always invents a fantasy which
explains in advance its inevitable failure. Ideology masks the real cause
of its impossibility, the lack in its structure, by projecting it onto an
external element that can be eliminated. The point is, of course, that
without this external reference point, the ideological fantasy would
immediately collapse, for it has no consistency in itself and totally
depends on its "outside." Therefore, beyond the "mechanisms of
imaginary and symbolic identification" we find in any ideological
structure some "pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment" (Zizek, The
Sublime 124). The last support of ideology is paradoxically the one
"element that represents within it its own impossibility," since it is
masked through identification and projected onto some positive presence outside the ideological network (Zizek, The Sublime 127). Beyond
identification we find-an identification.
It is obvious that this understanding of ideology is at odds with
Althusser's theory, according to which the ideological problematic "is
not conscious of itself," so that everybody-except Marxists-is sunk
in ideology (For Marx 69, 234). For Zizek, on the contrary, ideology
is self-conscious about its falsity which leads him back to the very
conspiracy theory Althusser rejected-the idea of Hitler, who knows
that the totalitarian project is impossible and thus "constructs a new
terrifying subject" (Zizek, For They Know 18) in order to "capture our
desire" (Zizek, The Sublime 126). Of course the question arises as to
how it was possible for Hitler not to believe in his own ideological
fantasy. Or in general: how can ideology know about its own impossibility in advance? What enables such self-reflective knowledge? If such
knowledge existed, one would have to conclude by analogy that the
subject knows in advance that its representation in language will fail and
therefore erects itself as a coherent subject knowing all along that it is
simply a lack-"subjectivity" strikes back. "Enjoyment" is definitely an important factor in the working of ideology, but to determine
it as its "last support" consciously exploited by every ideological
fantasy simply lets the question of subjectivity reappear in a different
context-it lets the process of interpellation reappear in the picture.
Smith, therefore, argues that we cannot regard interpellation as simply
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/7
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lytically informed explanations have to be "implicated back into their
socio-historical specificity," and Smith is quite explicit about some of
the achievements of Althusserian theory that are useful in this regard
(i.e., the concept of interpellation itself, the materiality and the performance of ideology) (Smith 77). No doubt, Althusser has "misread"
Lacan, but his misreadings have proven to be indispensable for the
necessary modifications of Marxist theory today.

Notes
1. Easthope's remark is taken from a yet unpublished paper presented at a
conference in Berkeley in May, 1992.

For Marx, for example, Althusser refers to his concept of
"overdetermination" as being borrowed from linguistics and psychoanalysis
(For Marx 206). Accordingly, Benton asserts that the borrowings ofAlthusser
"are of particular concepts . . . and not of the whole philosophical problem2. In

atic" (35).
"second degree ideology" in a slightly
different context in order to denote the complex nature of the imaginary
relation itself, i.e., the fact that it is not simply opposed to the "real" relation
between men and their world, but forms a complex, overdetermined unity with
it. I think both applications are justified.
3. Althusser uses the expression

4. This is the example Althusser chose himself, "Ideology" 51ff.
5. The differences between Althusser and Lacan concerning the concept

of the

`Other' are traced by Paul Smith, 20ff.

and Reality in Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1981). Connally too argues for an anthropological dimension
in theory that structural Marxism is merely able to suppress, but not to
eliminate (50).
6. See also William Connally, Appearance

7. An early exception is the essay "Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philoso-

phy of the Scientists," where Althusser redefines philosophy (philosophy is
not a science, etc.) and renders the relation between ideology and science more
problematic. See Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists
& Other Essays (London: Verso, 1990) 69-144. For an elaborate critique of
Althusser's rejection of empiricism and his understanding of scientific truth,
see Steven B. Smith, Reading Althusser. An Essay on Structural Marxism
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984) 108-40; and Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour
of Theory (London: Verso, 1987) 102ff.
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8. To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to note here that Althusser

distinguishes between an "eternal" Ideology in general with its function to
transform individuals, and its particular ideologies, i.e., the different practices
and apparatuses Ideology employs, which historically can vary depending on
social change.
9. Fredric Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism,
Psychoanalytical Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject," Yale French
Studies 55/56, 338-95.
10. It is crucial here to distinguish between "things" and "objects," the latter
of which are "things" subsumed under a concept of the logical system. The
"object" functions as the signifier of the "thing" within the system, " [w]hence
you can see the disappearance of the thing which must be effected in order for
it to appear as object-which is the thing in so far as it is one" (Miller 27).
11. The position Zizek rejects here is supported by Smith, who argues that

"resistance must be regarded as the by-product of contradictions in and among
subject-positions" caused through ideological interpellation (25).
12.

Zizek uses the terms "interpellation" and "subjectivation" alike (Zizek,

The Sublime 181).
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